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1.   INTRODUCTION 
Much of the literature on fiscal competition among independent jurisdictions has focused on the question of 
whether or not, in absence of coordination, tax rates will be set at efficient levels. While much attention has 
thus been devoted to the impact of fiscal competition on the overall level of public spending, little 
consideration has been given to its impact on the composition of public spending. Particularly, an important 
aspect of fiscal competition is to study what happens when the public good, subjected to the competition, is 
education and its effect on the redistributive policies. In the following chapter I’ll first expose some 
important results of the literature on fiscal competition1.  Then I present a simple model in which I analyse 
the impact of labor mobility on redistributive policies and the provision of education as a publicly provided 
good.  I’ve analysed different extensions of the model (Maximin objective function of the government and 
utilitarian function, symmetric and asymmetric population, one generation and two generation model) for 
check the results in different specifications of the world.  The model is exposed in the third chapter and the 
results obtained are in agreement to the literature: less redistribution and less provision of public good with 
respect to the efficient value (which could be obtained in the absence of mobility or in the presence of 
coordination among jurisdictions). The aim of this work is to underline this particular aspect of the fiscal 
competition: when we add up the two negative effects due to the absence of coordination among 
jurisdictions, the loss of efficiency is more accentuate. This result is important in the European contest 
because we have an increase of labor mobility and because, thanks to the treaty of Rome, the citizens of the 
other jurisdictions within the system must have fiscal treatments that are identical for all the citizens of the 
region in which they work. For this reason the possibility of brain drain added to fiscal competition and to an 
increase of the mobility can be more dangerous for the European jurisdictions and a coordination is 
necessary in the education policies and in the redistribution policies within the European Union2. 
 
 2.   SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE 
Most of the economic analysis of fiscal competition3 has focused on two fundamental aspects of the 
economic theory:  mobility and redistribution  and mobility and the optimal provision of public goods. In this 
paper I consider the two literatures jointly, so in the following paragraphs I analyse briefly how these two 
aspects are treated by the literature.  
                                                 
1 The studies on the impact of labor mobility on redistributive policies are numerous and the results are those expected: 
“redistribution is generally lower than in autarky or than within a cooperative setting”. 
 Moreover, there are numerous studies on mobility and optimal provision of public goods and the standard conclusion is 
that there is an externality associated with an individual’s migration that generally leads to an inefficient distribution of 
population across regions. Finally, some studies are focused on the impact of labor mobility on the provision of 
education. 
2 The evidence suggests that the countries of the Europe are experiencing inter-regional movements of labour and 
capital of significance magnitude. Different authors have studied the necessity of fiscal harmonization in Europe:  
Buchanan, J. M. (1950); Burda, M. and C. Wyplosz (1992); Cnossen, S. (1990); Edwards, J. and M. Keen, (1996); 
Inman R. P. and D. L.  Rubinfeld (1992); Janeba, E. and W. Peters (1993); Martin, R. and M. S. Steinen (1997); 
Obstfeld, W. and G. Peri (1998); Patsouratis, A. V. (1990); Sinn, H.-W. (1990); Smith, S. (1990); Braunerhjelm, P., R. 
Faini, V. Norman, F. Ruane and P. Seabright  (2000). 
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2.1 Mobility and Redistribution 
The results of the literature on labor mobility and redistribution are those expected: redistribution is generally 
lower than in autarky or than within a cooperative setting. The redistributive policies result in a kind of 
adverse selection: redistribution creates locational incentives that attract those who benefit from these 
policies (the poor) and repel contributors (taxpayers)4. Most studies conclude that the mobility of taxpayers 
reduces the ability of local governments to use taxes and transfers to redistribute income locally and most 
authors argue that international fiscal policy coordination can be desirable because national fiscal policy 
choices have consequences for efficiency in the international allocation of resources or for the international 
distribution of welfare. The literature on factor mobility and redistribution was early exclusively devoted to 
the setting of a federal state. The recent studies have concentrated on economic unions, also called 
confederations. In a federation there is central authority, which does not exist in a confederation. The issue of 
subsidiarity is also less pervasive in a federation than in a confederation. 
2.1.1 Conventional wisdom  
The conventional wisdom is that labor mobility across regions constraints each of them in its ability to 
pursue redistributive polices. If we consider a region in which there are just two groups of workers, skilled 
and unskilled, and we suppose that neither group is internationally mobile, then, redistribution such as 
taxation of the skilled with of transfer to the unskilled workers are in principle impeded only by potential 
work disincentives.  When we suppose that the skilled become mobile, they will migrate to regions levying 
lower taxes. If the region of reference is small relative to the world market for skilled workers, we have two 
results: first, the tax on the skilled has no effect on their after-tax incomes and, second, it generates an 
inefficiency cost which is borne by the immobile unskilled workers.  Then the redistribution becomes 
unsustainable, and if the unskilled workers are mobile instead of the skilled, the same unsustainability result 
obtains: regions offering relatively generous transfers to unskilled will experience an influx of unskilled and 
this undermines the financial feasibility of initial redistributive program. Whether the skilled or the unskilled 
can move are two cases often discussed separately. The so- called brain drain is often considered separately 
from the immigration of low skilled individuals. If a region can attract skilled or more generally high-income 
individuals, it will enlarge its tax base and achieve a better redistribution to the benefit of its low skilled 
residents. 
 
2.2 Mobility and optimal provision of public goods 
Greater mobility of capital and labor, consumers and taxpayers (individual and corporate) implies that 
international differences in taxes and the supply of public goods can induce migration of each of these. The 
increased mobility of persons, as well as of goods, services and financial capital raises the potential for fiscal 
spillovers across borders creating incentives for fiscal policy cooperation. The issue of fiscal policy 
                                                                                                                                                                  
3 Different authors have studied the role of tax competition, recent studies can be found in: Bucovetsky, S. and J. D. 
Wilson (1991-a); Bucovetsky, S. and J. D. Wilson (1991-b); Wildasin, David E. (1994); Wildasin, D. E. (1987); 
Wilson, J .D. (1988); Wilson, J .D (1999). 
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coordination in an international setting is a problem of determining the appropriate level of government 
making different sets of fiscal policy choices. The benefits and the costs of different public goods and 
externalities are realized on a variety of spatial scales. While some public goods (or bads) provide benefits 
(costs) on a global scale, others generate benefits only to users in a particular place, region or nation. In an 
economy with costless consumer mobility, it is known that a system in which individual jurisdictions 
compete in the supply of local public goods financed by using the local tax base will, in general, not yield a 
Pareto optimal equilibrium allocation. There is a large literature on the efficiency properties of a system of 
competing regional jurisdictions. One strand is the fiscal externality literature. It examines the problem 
associated with the attainment of an efficient regional population distribution.  The standard conclusion in 
the fiscal externality literature is that there is an externality associated with an individual’s migration that 
generally leads to an inefficient distribution of population across regions5.  Cooperative policy-making is 
also often proposed for income stabilization in the presence of international and trade and capital mobility. 
2.3 A particular kind of public good: “education” 
The greater mobility of labor in many parts of the word, and especially the increased integration of the 
European Union, have motivated extensive re-examination of economic and social policies. Increased labor 
mobility undermines the ability of those who pay for these policies to capture their full benefits, thus eroding 
essential political support. In the absence of some form of interjurisdictional compensation for these trans-
local benefits, large flows of skilled labor can be expected to erode the political support for local public 
funding of higher education (M. Justman and J-F. Thisse, 2000). Education in general accounts for as much 
as of 5% of GNP, and 10% or more of public spending in advanced industrialized countries, with public 
funding covering, on average, almost 90% of education costs in these countries. Higher education typically 
accounts for 15-20% of overall education expenditures. Migration of skilled labor implies that those who pay 
the bill for public higher education may find it difficult to fully capture its benefits. In the past this “brain-
drain” was a unidirectional flow of highly skilled labor from third –word countries. More recently, increased 
integration of labor markets, especially within the European Union, has drawn attention to problems that 
arise from bi-directional movement of skilled labor between similarly developed countries. Important is also 
analyse the students mobility6and how the education can influence the productivity growth of national 
economies7. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
4 “Mobility and redistribution” are analyzed by different authors: Cremer, H., V. Fourgeaud, M. L. Moriero, M. 
Marchand and P. Pestieau (1996); Epple, D. and T. Romer (1991). 
5 Non-optimality may occur because in moving from one region to another a migrant does not account for the effect of 
his moving on the tax price of the public good in the region he leaves (the tax prices rises) or enters (the tax price falls). 
6 J. Gordon and P. Jallade (1996) report that in 1993/94 “mobile” foreign students in EU countries (i.e., students not 
previously resident in the country where they were studying) numbered over 95,000. Similar inter-state mobility occurs 
in United States. In both cases, the impact of tertiary education transcends the boundaries of the local (sub-federal) 
jurisdictions where it is founded and where its budget are politically determined. 
 
7 National per capita endowment of human capital can diverge as a result of different lump sum fiscal policies and 
subsidies to education (as well as taste differences). Uncoordinated supplies of national public goods can lead to 
significant departures from allocative efficiency. The brain drain is one example of the possibility in an economy with 
heterogeneous individuals, since countries would compete to attract individuals with high endowments. 
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3.   MODEL 
 
Initial assumptions 
In these initial assumptions I refer, for simplify, directly to the overlapping generation version of the model. 
In realty the O.L.G. analysis is done only in the last part of this paper and for the others parts we refer to one-
generation model. I assume two regions, indexed 2,1=i , with the same initial population. 
I assume the population, born in each region, constant and equal to one half. 
t  2
1
,2,1 ∀== tt NN  
Each worker lives two periods: (young and old).  
                                                 1−t                t                 1+t             
                                               1−ty              1−to  
                  
                                           ty                 to
 
In each time we have then the co-existence of two generation of workers, then the total population of each 
region in time t is normalized to unity. For each generation, there are two types of workers. ih  denotes the 
amount of educated workers and il  the amount of non-educated workers who are both at work in region i . 
Within each type, each worker is endowed with one unit of homogeneous labor that he supplies inelastically 
in his region of residence. The two types of labour are perfect substitutes: ew  and nw  are numbers of 
efficiency units of labour per worker. There are fixed coefficients of transformation: one efficient unit of 
labour produces one unit of consumption good.  In other word, competitive firms produce the private good 
with a fixed-coefficient production specification  
i
n
i
e
ii lwhwlhf +=),(   for 2,1=i  
Where ih  and il are the only inputs necessary for production. All the firms in both regions have access to the 
same technology. With competitive labour and commodity markets, the firms pay each type of workers a 
wage equal to its marginal product, identical in the two regions: ew to educated workers and nw to non-
educated workers.  By assumption: en ww < , otherwise it would certainly not be appropriate to provide 
education. Only the government of each region provides education8. The government decides the amount of 
education is (i.e. the number of school places). Only the workers with young and middle age can be 
educated and we assume that the government decides in each time the optimal provision of education for 
                                                 
8 It’s possible consider the non-educated workers as the individuals with at least the secondary level of education and the 
educated workers the individuals which are more specialized. In this case the model can be more realistic and we can analyzed 
the brain drain phenomena when, as we see below, we assume that only the educated people are mobile.  
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each generation of workers. The cost of education is the same in each region and in each time and I suppose 
a quadratic cost function. Then, for each government the total education costs are: itit ss
ba 

 +
2
 with 
0,0 >> ba   t∀ . 
The regional authority maximizes, for each generation, the utility of his citizens9 by the use of lump sum 
taxes ( eit ) to educated workers and lump sum subsidies (
n
it ) to the non-educated workers.  Then the non 
educated’s available income is ni
nn
i twx += and the educated’s available income is eieei twx −= . 
Each Government must satisfy, for each generation, the budget constraint 
0)
2
( =−+− iniiiiei ltssbaht . 
 
Mobility specifications 
Only the educated people (young and old age) are mobile.  
Individuals are heterogeneous only with respect to their attachment to home. This parameter is denoted by 
n , with [ ]1,1−∈n . 
We assume that the distribution of tn is conditional on the education status of the worker. 
We assume that for each generation and in each time: 
For Region 1: t     
)0;(           have  workerseducated 
);1(    have  workerseducatednon 
1
1 ∀


−∈
−−∈
tt
tt
sn
sn
 
i.e. the former has the lowest values of tn , and the latter the highest ones. 
For Region 2:


∈
∈
);0(           have worker educated 
)1;(     have worker educatednon 
2
2
tt
tt
sn
sn
 
i.e. the former has the highest values of tn , and the latter the lowest ones. 
                                                 
9 We analyse two different cases: Maximin, subjective maximization. 
      Region 1                                                Region 2 
2 1        s          s-                               
                                    0                                     11−
n  
Educated individuals of type tn  derive utility from consumption of their net income and from their region of 
residence according to: 
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Where tn2
1
tk
 measures the non-pecuniary benefit from living in region 2 and tn2
1
tk
−  measures the 
benefit from living in region 1. Educated individuals, maximizing their utility, are free to choose their region 
of residence when they are young and when they are middle age, and take the behaviours of all other agents 
as given. 
If et
e
t tt 21 =  all educated individuals with 01 <≤− n would prefer to live in region 1; educated 
individuals with ( )121 ≤< n would prefer to live in region 2 and educated individual with 0=n  would be 
indifferent between the two regions. The migration equilibrium will be characterized by the marginal 
educated individual, denoted by nˆ , being indifferent between locating in either region, individuals with n  
less then nˆ  locate in region 1 and individuals with n greater than nˆ  locate in the region 2. 
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The number of educated workers being resident in region i  ( 1−+ itit hh ) can be different from the number 
of people having been educated in region i  ( 1−+ itit ss ). 
The distribution of the ith ’s )2,1( =i  is the following:  



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−∈+
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One generation model – Maximin case 
In the next paragraphs I assume that there is only one generation10 so I can concentrate my analysis on the 
role of the fiscal competition in the redistribution of income and in the provision of the education.   
 
Autarky solutions  
We consider then the autarky case in which we have no mobility of educated workers. In this case the 
policies of the other governments don’t have any effect on the decision of a government. This is equivalent 
to having a Central Authority that coordinates the politics of the two regions, so there aren’t negative 
externalities from fiscal competition. Then this case can be used as a benchmark to which we can compare 
the results obtained in the other cases. In this case there isn’t migration so ii sh =  is the total amount of 
educated workers and il = is−1  is the total amount of non-educated workers. 
Assume that each government maximizes the utility of the worst-off workers, i.e. use a Maximin criterion. In 
autarky, with lump sum taxes and transfers, nothing prevents the government from equalizing the available 
incomes of the two types of workers.  
Therefore each government chooses s and et so as  
ne tts
Max
,,
)( nn twU +                                                                      (1) 
)()( nnee twUtwU +=+  
ssbatsht ne )
2
()1( ++−≥  
or equivalently: 
                                                 
10 The one generation model is a particolar case of the O.L.G. model in which there isn’t differences between the two 
generations that can be considered as a unique generation normalized to one.  
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ne tts
Max
,,
 nt                                                                                     (2) 
nnee twtw +=+  
ssbatsht ne )
2
()1( ++−≥  
or equivalently: 
nts
Max
,
nt                                                                             (3) 
2
2
)( sbaswwst nen −−−≤  
or equivalently: 
s
Max   2
2
)( sbaswws ne −−−                                                           (4) 
Solving problem (4), we obtain  
:)(sFoc     bsaww ne +=−                         (5) 
Then the autarkic solutions is 
bsaww ne +=−                           (6) 
or   
b
a
b
wws
ne
−−=              (7) 
According to economic intuition, an increase in the education costs through either a or b  implies a decrease 
in the optimal provision of education places, while an increase in the difference of productivities makes s  
rise. The lump-sum tax and transfer are chosen so as to equate the available incomes of educated and non –
educated people and satisfy the government’s budget constraint. 
 
Mobility solutions  
We consider the case in which only educated people can migrate. In this case the policies of the other region 
have effects on the decisions of a region, so each government must take in account what the other does. In 
this case, in its maximization problem each government must take in account the possibility that there isn’t a 
correspondence between the education provided and the educated people resident in their region. 
Variable nˆ , which characterizes the effect of these policies on the decision to migrate, defines the educated 
worker who is indifferent between remaining in his region or migrating in the other region. [ ])()(ˆ 21 eeee twUtwUkn −−−=         (8) 
where nˆ  changes in response to difference in the taxations in the two regions. 
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According to economic intuition, we have: 


+−
ee ttn 21 ,ˆ  
since 0)(ˆ 1
1
<−′−=∂
∂ ee
e twUkt
n
          (9) 
and    0)(ˆ 2
2
>−′=∂
∂ ee
e twUkt
n
         (10) 
Contrary to autarky it is now possible that with Maximin objectives in the two regions fiscal competition 
makes the available income of non-educated workers lower that of educated at the Nash equilibrium. We 
therefore proceed by solving in a first step the following problem and then check in a second step whether 
the Nash equilibrium satisfies nnee twtw 11 +>− . 
Therefore in the first step we solve the following problem for the region 1: 
nts
Max
11,
  nt1                                                                                   (11) 
( ) 0)1()
2
(),(ˆ 11112111 =−−+−+ neee tsssbattnst  
or equivalently 
nts
Max
11,
( )
1
112111
1 1
)
2
(),(ˆ
s
ssbattnst
t
eee
n
−
+−+
=        (12) 
In (11) and (12) the choices of 1s  and 
et1 are simultaneously made. 
In the following paragraphs I analyse, together with this case, another one in which the is  ‘s are chosen in a 
first stage (anticipating their impact on the equilibrium of the second stage) and the eit ’s in a second stage. 
 
Mobility solution: Nash equilibrium with is  and 
e
it simultaneously determined 
In this case each government chooses its values is  and 
e
it simultaneously for a given policy of the other 
region and taking in account the possibility of migration of some educated workers as a response to its 
choices. 
For region 1 we have: 
ets
Max
11 ,
( )
1
112111
1 1
)
2
(),(ˆ
s
ssbattnst
t
eee
n
−
+−+
=        (13) 
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Solving (13) we have 
:)( 1
etFoc   
( )
0
1
),(ˆ
1
),(ˆ
1211
1
21
=−
−+ ∂
∂
s
tttns e
ee
t
ttneee
       (14) 
:)( 1sFoc       
( )
( ) 01
2
),(ˆ
1 21
2
112111
1
11 =−
−−+
+−
−−
s
sbasttnst
s
bsat
eee
e
   (15) 
Therefore, in the symmetric Nash equilibrium in which 2
1
21 ),(ˆ =ee ttn , we obtain 
   
e
ee
t
ttn
e st
1
21 ),(ˆ
1
1
∂
∂−=             (16) 
From (9), (16) becomes: 
)( 1
1
1 ee
e
twUk
st −′=           (17) 
At the symmetric Nash equilibrium, )( 1sFoc  yields: 
0
11 1
1
1
11 =−+−
−−
s
t
s
bsat ne
         (18) 
or  111 bsatt
ne +=+           (19) 
or  
b
a
b
tts
ne
−+= 111           (20) 
Two cases can be distinguished for different values of k . The higher the value of k  the stronger the fiscal 
competition between the two regions.  
 
Case 1: high value of k : strong fiscal competition  
Solving the system of three equations in three unknown: 
)( 1
1
1 ee
e
twUk
st −′=           (17) 
b
a
b
tts
ne
−+= 111            (20)  
The budget constraint yields nnee twtw 11 +>−  
Then the symmetric Nash Equilibrium is then given by (17) and (20). 
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Since  nene wwtt −<+ 11           (21) 
1s  is lower than in autarkic case. Therefore in this case, fiscal competition lowers both the provision of 
education and the magnitude of income redistribution. 
 
Case 2: low value of k : weak fiscal competition 
Solving (17) and (20) and the budget constraint yields nnee twtw 11 +<−  
In this case, the solution is such that the available income of non-educated workers turns out to be higher 
than that of the educated ones. As a consequence, with a Maximin objective the additional constraint: 
nnee twtw 11 +≥− , must be introduced into each government’s problem. Therefore, the same solution 
as in the autarky case is obtained. Summing up, there is a critical value ck  such that for ckk <  the 
autarky solution prevails at the Nash equilibrium while for ckk ≥ , redistribution and education provision 
are lower. 
 
Mobility solution: Nash equilibrium with is  and 
e
it  determined in different steps 
In this more realistic case, the is  ‘s are chosen in a first stage (anticipating their impact on the equilibrium of 
the second stage) and the eit ’s in a second stage. As in the previous case, the government must take into 
account the possibility of migration of some educated workers when it increases their income tax. 
We can determine the Nash Equilibrium by backward induction (starting from the second stage and then 
solving the first stage) Assuming that k is high enough for )()( eenn twUtwU −<+  at the Nash 
equilibrium. 
 
Second stage 
et
Max
1
( )
1
112111
1 1
)
2
(),(ˆ
s
ssbattnst
t
eee
n
−
+−+
=        (22) 
Solving (22) we have 
:)( 1tFoc   
( )
0
1
),(ˆ
1
),(ˆ
1211
1
21
=−
++ ∂
∂
s
tttns e
ee
t
ttneee
       (23) 
that yields 
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)( 1
21
1
1
1 ee
ee
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e
twUk
ttn
twUk
st −′+−′=          (24) 
It’s equivalent for country 2 
)(
),(ˆ
)( 2
21
2
2
2 ee
ee
ee
e
twUk
ttn
twUk
st −′−−′=          (25) 
Before to analyse the first stage we need to study the properties of (24) and (25). In Appendix (A) I obtain:
  
0   0
2
1
1
1 >>
ds
dt
ds
dt ee
                                  (26) 
0   0
2
2
1
2 >>
ds
dt
ds
dt ee
                            (27) 
 
First stage 
1s
Max
( )( )
,
1
)
2
(),(),,(ˆ),(
1
112122111211
1 s
ssbasstsstnssst
t
eee
n
−
+−+
=     (28) 
:)( 1sFoc
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( ) 01
)
2
(,ˆ),(
1
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2
1
11211211
1
111
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211 1
1
1
=−
+−+
+
+−
+−+++ ∂∂∂∂
s
ssbattnssst
s
sbsanssst
eee
s
t
s
ne e
     (29) 
the (29) from (24) and (A7) in the appendix A, becomes [ ] [ ]
0
(*)ˆ
12
1
111221
2
1
12
1
1221
221
11
=−
+−−−
−+
+−
−
++
s
tbsa
BABA
Bns
s
BABA
ABBtt nee
  (30) 
or equivalently [ ] 01 111 1221 12 =+−−+ − nBABA BAe tbsat         (31) 
[ ] 01 111 =+−−+ ne tbsaXt           (32) 
Where, from (A2) 
01221
12 >= − BABA BAX                             (33) 
For the region (2) we obtain: 
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[ ] 01 222 =+−−+ ne tbsaYt           (34) 
01221
12 >= − BABA BAY                    (35) 
Where 0>= YX  
The (24), by the symmetry becomes: 
)( 1
1
1 ee
e
twUk
st −′=                       (24’) 
b
a
b
tXts
ne
−++= 111 )1(                           (36) 
In the conclusions we compare the Nash equilibria obtained in the one-step-mobility case [k low: equation 
(17) and (20)], and the results obtained in the mobility case with two steps [equation (24’) and (36)]. 
From (26) we know that 0
1
1 >
ds
dt e
, from (36) and (24’) we can observe that, from the positive value of X , 
we have in the case with two steps a greater redistribution of income and a greater provision of education 
respect the one step case. These results are justified from the fact that in the two steps case we reduce the 
uncertainty and the opportunity of each jurisdiction to attract the educated workers by using the fiscal 
competition. Then we obtain in the two steps case a solution that it’s more closed to the optimal 
redistribution and optimal provision of education (autarkic case) respect to the one step case. 
 
One generation model - Subjective Utility function 
In these paragraphs I analyse the case in which the Government has a subjective utility function. Then the 
regional authority maximizes the utility of the workers, using a different objective function by the use of 
lump sum taxes ( eit ) to educated workers and lump sum subsidies (
n
it ) to the non-educated workers.  
 
Autarky solutions 
In this case there isn’t migration so ii sh = is the total amount of educated workers and il = is−1  is the 
total amount of non-educated workers. Assume that each government maximizes the utility of the workers 
using a new objective function.  Therefore each government chooses is and 
e
it so as  
ets
Max
11,
( )eeen twU
s
ssbast
wU 1
1
1111
1
)
2
(
−+








−
+−
+ α                                        (37) 
with 10 ≤≤α  
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Solving problem (37), we obtain  
:)( 1tFoc  0)(1
)( 1
1
1
1 =′−



−′
en yU
s
syU α                                       (38) 
:)( 1sFoc 01
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1
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1
1 =



−
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∂
∂
s
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y
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n
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          (39) 
where:  
e
n
n
e
e
e
nnn
eee
t
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t
yUyU
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twy
1
1
1
1
1
1
11
11
)()(
)()(
∂
∂=′
∂
∂=′
+=
−=
 
From (38) and (39) we have 
)(1)( 1
1
1
1
en yU
s
syU ′


 −=′ α           (40) 
0111 =+−− ne tbsat            (41) 
According with the economic intuition, we have [Appendix B: (B2) and (B3)] 
0          0 11 << αα d
ds
d
dt e
                           (42) 
An increase in the parameterα , which implies a greater weight of the utility of educated in the 
maximization of the government, has a negative effect in the redistribution and in the provision of education. 
When 0=α  we are in the Maximin case. 
)()( 11
en yUyU ′=′                                (43) 
which implies that the utilities of the non-educated workers must be equal to the utilities of educated 
workers. 
)()( 11
en yUyU =                             (44) 
nene wwtt −=+ 11                           (45)  
Then (41) becomes 
b
a
b
wws
ne
−−=1                              (46) 
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Then we obtain, with a subjective utility function, the same solutions seen in the Autarkic case with a 
Maximin criterion. 
 
Mobility solutions 
We consider the same mobility specifications seen in the previous paragraphs. 
Assume that each government maximizes the utility of the workers using the objective function seen in the 
autarkic case. In this case, in its maximization problem each government must take in account the possibility 
that there isn’t a correspondence between the education provided and the educated people resident in their 
region. Then we have, as in Maximin case: 
nsh ˆ11 +=  and nsh ˆ22 −= . [ ])()(ˆ 21 eeee twUtwUkn −−−=   
 
Mobility solution: Nash equilibrium with is  and 
e
it simultaneously determined 
Each government chooses its values is  and 
e
it simultaneously for a given policy of the other region and 
taking in account the possibility of migration of some educated workers as a response to its choices. 
For region 1 we have: 
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+ α     (47) 
Solving (47) we have 
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


−
+−−
∂
∂
s
tbsat
y
yU ne
n
n
                                      (49) 
Therefore, in the symmetric Nash equilibrium in which 0),(ˆ 21 =ee ttn , we obtain ( )[ ] )()()1()()( 1111111 neene yUsyUsyUkyUt ′−′−=′−′ α       (50) 
or, equivalently 
)(
)1(
)( 1
1
1
1
1 ne
e
yUk
s
yUk
st ′
−−′=
α
                               (51) 
 from )( 1sFoc  we obtain 
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111 bsatt
ne +=+                               (52) 
b
a
b
tts
ne
−+= 111                                  (53) 
According with the economic intuition, we have [Appendix C: (C2) and (C3)] 
0             0 11 << αα d
ds
d
dt e
                             (54) 
An increase in the parameterα , which implies a greater weight of the utility of educated in the 
maximization of the government, has a negative effect in the redistribution and in the provision of education. 
When 0=α , the (51) is the same of  (17) 
)( 1
1
1 ee
e
twUk
st −′=                  (17) 
When 0>α , we have that  
ene Uk
s
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s
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−−′
α
 
then we have in this case less redistribution and less provision of education with respect to the Maximin case. 
 
Mobility solution: different value of α between Regions 
For region 1 we have: 
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
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For region 2 we have: 
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Solving (55) we have 
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                          (58) 
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(*)ˆ
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                             (59) 
from )( 1sFoc  we obtain 
111 bsatt
ne +=+                                 (60) 
b
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b
tts
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Solving (56) we have 
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 from )( 2sFoc  we obtain 
222 bsatt
ne +=+                         (65) 
b
a
b
tts
ne
−+= 222                               (66) 
When βα =  we have ee tt 21 = , then we have a symmetric Nash Equilibrium seen in previous case. 
When βα >  we have an ambiguous effect in the redistribution as we can see in the Appendix (D).From 
one side the Region 1 has a less redistribution of the Region 2 (and consequently has less provision of 
education from the 60) from the fact that βα > . From other side the fact that ee tt 21 < gives to Region 1 
the possibility to attract educated people from the other region, 0),(ˆ 21 >ee ttn , then the Region 1 can 
increase et1 as we can see from the (59). 
 
One generation model - Asymmetric population 
Let’s assume that the two regions, indexed 2,1=i  have different initial population; the total population of 
the first region is normalized to unity.  
101 =N      cN += 102  
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The mobility specifications are the same seen before.  [ ]cn +−∈ 1,1  
For Region 1:


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−−∈
)0;(           have  workerseducated 
);1(    have  workerseducatednon 
1
1
sn
sn
 
For Region 2:
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∈
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);0(           have worker educated 
)1;(     have worker educatednon 
2
2
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    Region 1                                                Region 2 
2 1        s          s-                               
c                                    0                                     +− 11
   n  
The distribution of the ih ’s )2,1( =i  is the following:  
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        ih  
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21 ss +  
 
                                                 
                  1−                        1s−                                 2s               c+1       nˆ
 
Mobility solution 
In this case each government chooses its values is  and 
e
it simultaneously for a given policy of the other 
region and taking in account the possibility of migration of some educated workers as a response to its 
choices. For region 1 we have: 
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Solving (67) we have 
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From (9), (67) becomes: 
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The )( 1sFoc  yields: 
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For region 2 we have: 
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Solving (74) we have 
:)( 2
etFoc   
( )
0
1
),(ˆ
2
),(ˆ
2211
1
21
=−+
−− ∂
∂
sc
tttns e
ee
t
ttneee
                   (75) 
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From (9), (75) becomes: 
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The )( 2sFoc  yields: 
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or     222 bsatt
ne +=+              (79) 
or     
b
a
b
tts
ne
−+= 222                                   (80) 
Two cases can be distinguished for different values of k . The higher the value of k  the stronger the fiscal 
competition between the two regions. We have for both regions the same results obtained in the symmetric 
case. 
Parametric Solutions  
To solve the asymmetric case we must have a parametric solution. Assume a quadratic utility function   
2
11 )()(
eeee twtwU −=−       
Then (70), (72), (77) and (79) become 
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eeeee
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Solving these four equations we obtain the following best responses11:  
0140398)4205959(88439 24223 =−+++++++− yyyxyyxx  
                                                 
11 For simplicity we assume these value for the parameters: 
1;10;1;2 ==== k w a b e  
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Where  
e
e
ty
tx
2
1
=
=
 
In the following pictures we simulate how the value of x and y change when: 
1) The two regions have the same population (c=0) 
2) The region two has population equal to 1.5 (c=0.5) 
3) The region two has twice population of region one (c=1) 
1) The two regions have the same population (c=0)  
 
0087.01 == etx  0087.02 == ety  0ˆ =n     17384.021 == ss    17384.021 == hh  
2) The region two has population equal to 1.5 (c=0.5) 
 
00769.01 == etx 01038.02 == ety  05375.0ˆ =n  
09993.01 =s 26113.02 =s  15368.01 =h  20738.02 =h  
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3) The region two has twice population of region one (c=1) 
 
00024.01 == etx 02059.02 == ety  4059.0ˆ =n 4010.01 −=s  81685.02 =s  
4059.01 =h 41095.02 =h
These results, according with the economic intuition, show that when we have asymmetric population the 
region with less population has less taxation of the other region. These results are justified because for the 
bigger region is convenient lose same educated worker and have greater income to redistribute (the impact of 
the fiscal competition of the smaller region it’s non stronger enough to justify low taxes). The region 1 has a 
provision of education negative (it’s impossible so we can assume equal to zero) because it’s convenient 
attract educated worker from region two and have no educated worker formed at home. 
 
Overlapping generation model 
In this paragraph assume that exist two different generations and that is verified the entire hypothesis seen in 
the initial assumptions.  The main difference is that the two generations have different propensity to migrate, 
then I study what is the impact of this more realistic assumption on the results obtained in the previous 
specifications of the model. In the previous paragraphs (with only one generation) I’ve assumed that the 
regional authority maximizes the utility of his citizens (Maximin case and subjective maximization) by the 
use of lump sum taxes ( eit ) to educated workers and lump sum subsidies (
n
it ) to the non-educated workers.  
In this OLG version I assume that the regional authority tries to capture in each time, by the use of lump sum 
taxes ( eit ) to educated workers, the gain dues to the education provided in each time. Furthermore we 
assume that, for each generation we have nee wtw ≥− , otherwise it’s not convenient be educated. Then 
exist a value maximum of eit and we assume that it’s known. ),0(
maxtt ei ∈   
 
Autarky solutions  
We consider then the autarky case in which we have no mobility of educated workers. In this case the 
policies of the other governments don’t have any effect on the decision of a government. This is equivalent 
to having a Central Authority that coordinates the politics of the two regions, so there aren’t negative 
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externalities from fiscal competition. Then this case can be used as a benchmark to which we can compare 
the results obtained in the other cases. In this case there isn’t migration so 11 −− +=+ itititit sshh is the 
total amount of educated workers. The regional authority tries to capture in each time, by the use of lump 
sum taxes ( eit ) to educated workers, the gain dues to the education provided in each time. Therefore each 
government chooses s and et . We know that exist a value maximum of eit and we assume that it’s known 
),0( maxtt ei ∈ . Then, from the fact that in autarkic case the educated workers can’t emigrate, the optimal 
value of the taxation is the maximum. 
Where  ne wwt −=max                         (85) 
 
t
ss
RMax
tt
:
;1−
                         (86) 
with 
        [ ] )
2
()
2
( 11
max
11 ttttttt s
bassbastssR +−+−+= −−−−  
 
:)( tsFOC         0
max =−− tbsat                                      (87) 
:)( 1−tsFOC     01
max =−− −tbsat                                  (88) 
 
Then the solution is: 
sss tt == −1                                       (89) 
b
ats −=
max
                                          (90) 
From the (85) the solution is: 
 
b
awws
ne −−= )(                               (91) 
with   )1,0(∈s  
According to economic intuition, an increase in the education costs through either a or b  implies a decrease 
in the optimal provision of education places, while an increase in the difference of productivities makes s  
rise.12 
 
Mobility solutions  
We consider the case in which only educated people (young and old age) can migrate. In this case the 
policies of the other region have effects on the decisions of a region, so each government must take in 
account what the other does. 
                                                 
12It’s important note that the equations (90) corresponding to the same solution obtained in the one generation model. 
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In this case, in its maximization problem each government must take in account the possibility that there 
isn’t a correspondence between the education provided and the educated people resident in their region. 
Variable tnˆ , which characterizes the effect of these policies on the decision to migrate, defines the educated 
worker who is indifferent between remaining in his region or migrating in the other region. [ ])()(ˆ ,2,1 e teetett twUtwUkn −−−=                      (92) 
where tnˆ  changes in response to difference in the taxations in the two regions. 
According to economic intuition, we have: 


+−
e
t
e
tt ttn 21 ,ˆ  
since  0)(
ˆ
1
1
<−′−=∂
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                       (93) 
and   0)(
ˆ
2
2
>−′=∂
∂ e
t
e
te
t
t twUk
t
n
                     (94) 
Contrary to autarky it is now possible that fiscal competition between the two regions makes the lump-sum 
tax for educated worker lower then its maximum value.  
The mobility case can be analyzed in two different cases: 
1) ( t     1 ∀== − kkk tt ) One generation model. 
2) ( t     1 ∀≠ −tt kk ) Two generation model. 
each generation of workers has different propensity to migrate, then we can have two situation: 
 2.1)  ( 2,1  ,1,1 =∀==− ittt eietie ti ) Equal taxation between generations.  
2.2)   ( 2,1  ,1,1 =∀≠− itt etie ti ) Different taxation between generations. 
 
1) One generation model. 
It’s possible demonstrate that the analysis of this case it’s a particular case of the model studied in the first 
part of this paper were each generation of workers has the same propensity to migrate and there isn’t no other 
differences between the generation of workers.   [ ])()(ˆ 21 eeee twUtwUkn −−−=  
In this version of the model we have 01 =nt  (we don’t care of the redistribution problem) but all the 
analysis are the same seen in the one-generation model. 
 
2.1) Equal taxation between generations. [ ])()(ˆ 2111 eeeett twUtwUkn −−−= −−     for the old generation. 
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[ ])()(ˆ 21 eeeett twUtwUkn −−−=         for the young generation. 
In this case each government chooses its values is  and 
e
it simultaneously for a given policy of the other 
region and taking in account the possibility of migration of some educated workers as a response to its 
choices. For region 1 we have: 
t
tss
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e
tt
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1,11,1 ;;−
                         (95) 
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Solving (95) we have 
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etFOC ( ) ( ) 0ˆˆˆˆ 1
11
1
,111,1 =


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:)( ,1 tsFOC      0,11 =−− te bsat                                    (97) 
:)( 1,1 −tsFOC   01,11 =−− −te bsat                      (97’) 
 
From (96) and (97) we obtain:  
11,1,1 sss tt == −                         (98) 
where  
b
ats −= 11                           (99) 
From (92), (93) and (96) we have: 
 [ ] 0)()(ˆˆ2 11111 =−′+−++ −− eeetttt ttwUkknns                                       (100) 
 
Therefore, in the symmetric Nash equilibrium in which 0ˆˆ 1 == −tt nn , we obtain 
)()( 112
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1 ee
tt
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twUkk
s
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                     (101) 
If we consider that  
)( 12
1
tt kkk += −  
We can compare these results with the solution obtained in the one-generation model. When we introduce 
different generations and we assume equal taxation the government must apply a level of taxation that take in 
account an average of the propensity to migrate of each generation.13 
                                                 
13 As in the one generation model I have demonstrate that by introducing the mobility of educated workers and solving the 
symmetric Nash Equilibrium, two cases can be distinguished for different values of k . The higher the value of k  the 
stronger the fiscal  competition between the two regions.  
Summing up, there is a critical value ck  such that for ckk <  the autarky solution prevails at the Nash equilibrium while 
for ckk ≥ , redistribution and education provision are lower. 
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2.2) Different taxation between generations. [ ])()(ˆ 1,21,111 e teetett twUtwUkn −−−− −−−=        for the old generation. 
[ ])()(ˆ ,2,1 e teetett twUtwUkn −−−=                 for the young generation. 
In this case each government chooses its values is  and 
e
it simultaneously for a given policy of the other 
region and taking in account the possibility of migration of some educated workers as a response to its 
choices. For region 1 we have: 
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Solving (102) we have 
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:)( ,1 tsFOC         0,1,1 =−− tet bsat                       (105) 
:)( 1,1 −tsFOC     01,11,1 =−− −− tet bsat                         (106) 
From (105) and (106) we obtain: 
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From (92), (93), (103) and (104) we obtain 
0)(ˆ ,1,1,1 =−′−+ etetettt ttwUkns                         (109) 
0)(ˆ 1,11,1111,1 =−′−+ −−−−− etetettt ttwUkns                     (110) 
Therefore, in the symmetric Nash equilibrium in which 0ˆˆ 1 == −tt nn , we obtain 
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We can compare these results with the solution obtained in the one-generation model. 
When we introduce different generations and we assume equal taxation the government must apply a level of 
taxation that take in account the propensity to migrate of each generation. Then if the government known the 
exact value of this propensity and can combine for each generation his specific tax we obtain the result seen 
in the note (14). 
 
Dynamic of the model  
In this simple model we assume the population constant and equal in the two regions, then the dynamic are 
due to the change in the propensity to migrate of the different generations. 
We can analyse two different cases: 
Case A 
If t     1 ∀== − kkk tt  (so we are in the first case analyzed before) then we are in one-generation 
model, which are static. 
Case B 
If  t     1 ∀≠ −tt kk , and we can be sure that for each generation there is a constant trend in the change of 
the value of the propensity to migrate, then we can study the dynamic of the Nash Equilibria that we have 
found. The symmetric Nash Equilibria in the “different taxation” case are: 
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and in the previous analysis I’ve found that 
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From the (111) and the (113) it’ possible to write ( ) ,1,1 ett ts Φ=  with ( ) 0 ,1 >Φ′ ett                          (115) 
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Two different cases can be distinguish 
Case B,1: t     1 ∀> −tt kk  and etie ti tt ,1,1 ≠−  
The new generations are more mobile of the old ones 
In this case the (116) becomes      0
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Case B,2: t     1 ∀< −tt kk  and etie ti tt ,1,1 ≠−  
The new generations are more mobile of the old ones 
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Dynamic of s  and steady state  
I study the dynamic of s  in the case B,1 and B,2 seen before 
Case B,1: t     1 ∀> −tt kk  
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Then the unique Steady State is the Zero education case (point B in the picture)  
Case B,2: t     1 ∀< −tt kk   
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4.  Concluding remarks 
0== βα  
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In this schedules are summarized the results obtained in the previous chapters. 
The results obtained are in agreement to the literature: less redistribution and less provision of public good 
with respect to the efficient value (which could be obtained in the absence of mobility or in the presence of 
coordination among jurisdictions). In the first schedule I reassume the solutions obtained when 
0== βα , the Maximin case, and what happened if we consider the two steps ore the one step case14. In 
the second schedule, I reassume the solutions obtained when 0>= βα  and According to the literature 
when we increase the weight of the utility of educated in the maximization of the government, we have a 
negative effect in the redistribution and in the provision of education. Furthermore, more relevant is the fact 
that when βα ≠ , third schedule, we introduce a new tool of competition that the Jurisdiction can use and 
we obtain a greater inefficiency in redistribution and in provision of education. In the asymmetric case I have 
analysed the possibility to have different initial population. In this case it’s not possible found a symmetric 
Nash Equilibrium than I’ve simulated the different equilibria obtained by different parametric specifications 
(assuming the population of region 1 the 50% more then the region 2, with the same population and with 
twice population) and I’ve compared the three cases. According to the economic intuitions I’ve found that 
when increase the difference among population the region with less population has less taxation respect the 
other because the role of the Fiscal Competition of the smaller region it’s no stronger enough to justify low 
taxes for the bigger. In the O.L.G. specification I’ve analysed the role of the parameter k (propensity to 
migrate). Using this specification I can introduce the analysis of the model in a dynamic context. The results 
are that if the new generation are more mobile, then the fiscal competition increase and increase the gain that 
we can obtain with coordination among jurisdictions; otherwise, if the new generations are less mobile the 
necessity of coordination are no stronger and we come back (for lower values of k) in the autarkic case 
independently the level of coordination among regions.  
Resuming, in the previous paragraphs are analysed different specifications of the model that emphasise a 
particular aspect of the fiscal competition: when we add up the two negative effects due to the absence of 
coordination among jurisdictions, the loss of efficiency is more accentuate. Then we can conclude that the 
Jurisdiction can compete to the others by use different levels of taxation, different level of provision of 
public goods (especially education), different subjective utility functions or with combination of these three 
tools. In the model we have found different results, in some case these results can be compared and in others 
it’s impossible to do, but in all case the conclusion is the same: a more realistic analysis of the fiscal 
competition can be done if and only if we try to analyse all the different tools that each jurisdiction use to 
compete with the others. Otherwise, if we focus our analysis in only one tool, we could sub-estimate the 
inefficiency due to the mobility and propose solutions that are inadequate to resolve these problems.  
                                                 
14 First justification at this hypothesis is that it is more realistic assumption. Second possibility is that a central authority 
can decide to coordinate the jurisdictions only respect the taxation to educated workers (more simple to check) and 
giving the possibility to each jurisdiction to choose independently the level of provision of education.  
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Appendix A 
Using the theorem of implicit functions we differentiate the system given by (24) and (25) and we obtain: 
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Solutions of the (A1), by using the Cramer Rule are: 
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Appendix B 
 
Using the theorem of implicit functions we differentiate the system given by (38) and (41) and we obtain: 
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The (B1) becomes 
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Appendix C 
 
Using the theorem of implicit functions we differentiate the system given by (51) and (52) and we obtain: 
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Appendix D 
 
Using the theorem of implicit functions we differentiate the system given by (59), (60), (64) and (65) and we 
obtain: 
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